I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of the computer network technologies, more and more users need to use the remote resource. Various resources are shared across the network in the form of network services provided by remote servers. Registered users (clients) request services through the network system. However, an eavesdropper may impersonate a legal user to login into the server and access the service in the public network. Therefore remote user authentication plays an important role in protecting resources against unauthorized usage. It is a procedure that allows a server to authenticate a remote user through an insecure channel [1] .
The password-based authentication scheme is the most commonly used technique to provide authentication between the legal users and the remote server [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . A password-based authentication scheme with smart cards can provide more secure authentication [12] [13] [14] [15] . A legal user can succeed to login the remote server if only he/she knows the password and has the smart card for the authentication. It is interesting to design a passwordbased authentication scheme with smart cards for remote user authentication.
An important security problem about using smart cards is that smart card security breach threatens the security of password-based authentication schemes with smart cards. The secret information stored in a smart card may be extracted by some physical methods, such as timing analysis [16] , power analysis [17] , electronic magnetic analysis [18] , and faulty induction analysis [19] . If a legal user's smart card is lost and it is picked up by a malicious attacker, or an attacker steals the user's smart card, the user's sensitive data may be derived out by the attacker.
Smart card security breach sometimes was neglected when designing a password authentication scheme. K.Shim showed in [20] that three password authentication scheme with smart cards, which were proposed by S.K. Kim et al. [12] , H.C. Hsiang et al. [13] and Y.Y. Wang et al. [14] in 2009 respectively, cannot resist smart card security breach attacks. In 2011 C.T. Li et al. also noted smart card security breach was not considered in S.K. Kim et al.'s scheme and they proposed an authentication scheme against smart card security breach instead of S.K. Kim et al.'s scheme [15] .
However, we note that C.T. Li et al.'s scheme needs a verification table in the remote server. A verification table should not be involved in a good password authentication scheme with smart cards, since verification tables will cause potential security threatens such as stolen-verifier attacks and insider attacks. C.T. Li et al.'s scheme solves the problem on smart card security breach attacks by maintaining a verification table in the remote server. Their scheme cannot be considered as a good password authentication scheme using smart cards.
In this paper, based on secure hash functions, we propose a new password-based authentication scheme using the smart card. The proposed scheme improves the security of C.T. Li et al.'s scheme, i.e., it can resist smart card security breach attacks and does not need verification tables. We also show that the proposed scheme satisfies all the main security requirements for remote user authentication.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some notations used in this paper. Section 3 recalls S.K. Kim et al.'s scheme and C.T. Li et al.'s scheme. Section 4 describes our scheme. The security analysis of our scheme is presented in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
User authentication schemes can be classified into two categories: hash-function-based and encryption-based. Hash-function-based schemes have low computational cost and easier to implement, while encryption-based schemes using symmetric or public encryption algorithms have high computational cost though they can provide more security features including the remote user authentication.
For the sake of self-containedness we simply recall secure hash functions.
In cryptography a hash function is an algorithm that takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bit string, which is called the hash value, such that an (accidental or intentional) change to the data will (with very high probability) change the hash value. The data to be encoded is often called the "message," and the hash values are sometimes called the (message) digest [21] .
Let It is clear that once the attacker has correctly derived the user's password i PW , he/she can use the stored information on the stolen or lost smart card to forge a valid login request to impersonate a legal user.
B. Li et al.'s Scheme
After noting the security flaw of smart card security breach in Kim et al.'s scheme, C.T. Li et al. described an authentication scheme which solves the security flaw of smart card security breach. We will not give the description of Li et al.'s scheme. The reader is referred to [15] . Here we only point out that Li et al.'s scheme needs a verification table in the remote server.
In ID r E M T , used in a current run of the protocol will be changed for the next run of the protocol.
C. Session Key Agreement Phase
The session key agreement phase is based on a legal login and Diffie-Hellman key exchange mechanism.
Suppose that the server and smart cards share a cyclic group G of large enough order l with generator g ∈G . 4. Upon receiving the message from the smart card, the server derive out g β similarly and uses g αβ as the session key.
In the session key agreement phase, the smart card can derive g α from K and the server can since derive g
D. Password Update Phase
The password update phase includes a legal login and verification phase. 
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In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed scheme. We show that the proposed scheme satisfies all 2 3 , , , 
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Encrypted Communication using session key g αβ Figure 3 . Session Key Agreement the main security requirements for remote user authentication. It has been concluded that a good password authentication scheme with smart cards should satisfy the following requirements [2, 21] . 1. users can freely choose and update passwords; 2. low computational cost; 3. session key agreement; 4. mutual authentication between login users and remote servers; 5. prevention of all the possible attacks such as impersonation attacks, off-line password guessing attacks, replay attacks and parallel-session attacks; 6. resistance to password disclosure to the server, i.e., privacy of passwords; 7. forward security of session keys; 8. without maintaining verification tables; 9. prevention of smart card security breach attacks.
We point out that the proposed scheme can satisfy 9 requirements above.
The password i PW is freely chosen by i U in the registration phase. i U can update his/her password by a password update phase. The proposed scheme includes a session key agreement phase that can generate a secure session key. The proposed scheme has low computational cost since it is mainly based on operations of hash functions except the session key agreement phase.
Impersonation attacks cannot work in the proposed scheme without i U 's smart card i SC . Even if the attacker steals the i U 's smart card, he/she can not impersonate i U to login the server since he/she does not know i U 's password i PW . Off-line password guessing is also impossible. Login and verification phase will be completed by the server after smart cards submit the login request and the verification information. The smart card is not able to directly verify the validity of the password. The validity of the password can be verified only by the remote server. Without the remote server smart cards are not able to determine if a guessed password is valid.
The attacker cannot deceive the server by replay attacks. The verification information including The proposed scheme achieves mutual authentication between login users and remote servers. The server authenticates the user by checking 1 M while the user authenticates the server by checking 2 M . Mutual authentication between login users and remote servers is the countermeasure for man-in-the-middle attacks. 
V CONCLUSION
In this paper, we note that C.T. Li et al.'s scheme, which can prevent smart card security breach attacks, needs a verification table in the remote server. The existence of verification tables is not good for a secure password-based authentication scheme. Based on secure hash functions, we proposed a password-based authentication scheme against smart card security breach and without maintaining verification tables. The proposed scheme satisfies all the main security requirements for remote user authentication.
